This paper proposes to assess the usefulness of central banks forward guidance since the start of the global economic crisis. Using a novel approach, the Wordscores methodology, we reveal that since 2009, central banks do provide a temporal guidance of their accommodative policy that can be relied on and expected. Central banks communication thus
Introduction
Through forward guidance, central banks try to influence expectations of financial markets by communicating about their future policy, as a consequence, central bank watchers, financial media and market participants pay considerable attention to central bankers' statements. Forward guidance has thus become an important tool for central banks, more and more described as the art of managing expectations, since it can enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions and helps achieve central bank's macroeconomic objectives. Most of the empirical studies that dealt with the predictability of central banks' statements refer to central banks from developed economies, such as the ECB, or the Fed. There is a broad consensus that these central banks' communication policy contains forward guidance and move financial markets in the intended direction (Musard-Gies, 2006; Willhemsen and Zaghini, 2011; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009 ). Carlson et al. (2006) find that the communication framework built by the FOMC improved the public's ability to predict interest rate decision. Rosa (2009) shows that the tone of central bank statements is an important explanatory variable of future changes in the ECB main refinancing rate, while Gerlach-Kristen (2004) shows that the voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee helps predict future policy rate changes.
However, the recent economic crisis has brought further challenges for these central banks in light of the uncertainties and the lack of confidence in financial markets, making their forward guidance more crucial than ever for the success of their monetary policy. Following this line of thought, Campbell et al. (2012) introduce a new term to define the practice of forward guidance since the start of the global economic crisis. They describe it as being "Odyssean forward guidance", which is the central bank's commitment to deviate from the established policy rule at the point in the future when the policy rate is normally expected to rise above zero. The commitment is to keep the interest rate at zero longer than the policy rule would suggest. The reason central banks use "Odyssean forward guidance" is because they have lost the ability to ease policy through the normal channel when the interest rate is constrained at its Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). The objective of forward guidance at the ZLB is thus to reduce uncertainty, thereby lowering interest rate volatility and through this channel possibly also risk premia (Filardo and Hofmann, 2013) . Several papers argue that such forward guidance can raise output in that situation by lowering the expected future policy rate (Campbell et al., 2012; Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Krugman, 1998; Levin et al., 2010; Nakov, 2008; Walsh, 2009; Werning, 2011; Woodford, 2012) . Garvin et al. (2013) provide a theoretical modeling of the stimulative effect of central bank forward guidance when the nominal interest rate is stuck at its ZLB. They show that it lowers the expected nominal interest rate and increases current consumption.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet empirically assessed the accommodative stance of central banks' forward guidance since the start of the global economic crisis through the central banks own discourses. In this paper, we do this for four central banks: the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. Relying on their official policy statements, this paper proposes to fill the gap of the literature by using the Wordscores approach introduced in section 2. In section 3, we outline the results. The last section concludes.
The Wordscores approach

The methodology
Given that forward guidance effectiveness also requires that it is clearly communicated to the public, we use the Wordscores methodology to assess the content of central banks' forward guidance since the onset of the global economic crisis. Introduced by Laver et al. (2003) , this technique, using computerized content analysis, compares the patterns of words used in a set of "reference texts" with known policy positions, with words contained in "virgin texts", to estimate their respective policy positions. Words are then treated as data, rather than something to be "interpreted" by agents (Krippendorff, 2004) , based on the assumption that the relative frequencies of the use of specific words provide information on monetary decisions. However, the meaning of a specific word often depends on the context in which it is used. For instance, while the word "growth" appears to be a positive signal, the phrase "slow growth" does not.
Therefore, we rely on two-word combinations of a noun and an adjective in this analysis, such as "lower inflation" or "higher unemployment". This approach differs notably from previous methods as it does not need to use predefined coding dictionaries as Bligh and Hess (2010) , nor subjective judgments by human coders as in Bulir et al. (2010) . The reliability of this approach is enhanced since the human factor is removed from the coding process. Wordscores can be implemented using a command line version for Stata 1 .
This technique requires estimates of the positions of the "references texts", for example, using a dimension tightening/easing. Wordscores then estimates the score of a two-word combination, based on its relative frequency in "reference texts" followed by a tightening/easing monetary policy. These combinations can be thought of as signals that will serve as the basis for estimating policy stances of the "virgin texts". The Wordscores methodology is defined as follows (Laver et al., 2003) :
P robability w,r = F requency w,r r F requency w,r wordscore w = r P robability w,r × V alue r
where w denotes a two-word combination in "reference text", r denotes "reference text", and V alue r denotes the assigned value of the "reference text".
For instance, assume that the two-word combination "high vigilance" appears 10 times in a "reference text" followed by a tightening policy 2 and 2 times in a "reference text" followed by an easing policy 3 . Then, the probability of "high vigilance" in a tightening "reference text"
(i.e., P robability (w:high vigilance,r:tightening) ) will be 0.84 (= 10 10+2 ), and the probability of "high vigilance" in an easing "reference text" (i.e., P robability (w:high vigilance,r:easing) ) will be 0.16 (= 2 10+2 ). Using these probabilities, we calculate the wordscore of "high vigilance" as follows: 
Data
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England (BoE) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) adopted "Odyssean forward guidance" on policy rates. Except for the BoE that has an explicit inflation target, and the BoJ 3 denoted with a value of (-1) 4 Except for the Bank of Japan that has adopted forward guidance in the context of its zero interest rate policy in 1999.
that has adopted an inflation targeting regime of 2% following government's pressures at the end of 2012, the ECB and the Fed have not adopted an explicit inflation target strategy for the period under review. As such, they can be considered to have to manage their communication policy more efficiently than targeting central banks whose communication can be more easily focused (Gürkaynak et al., 2006; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007) . Moreover, in our view, the BoJ is particularly interesting: first, because the creeping deflation has led it into the ZeroLower Bound region much before the two others and, second, because of its sudden strategic change since December 2012-related to the "Abenomics" deflationary program endorsed by its new chairman.
The method is implemented on this sample using statements that are considered to be a relevant source of information for central bank watchers, hence, these latter may be different across central banks. Then, one might argue that we compare "apples and pears" if we consider different communication tools, but it is worth nothing that for some central banks, the structure of communication instruments such as press releases or post-meeting statements have evolved through time due to changing communication strategies (e.g., for the BoJ), thereby rendering the Wordscores analysis inaccurate if used (cf. Section 2.1). We then only consider communication tools that have a consistent structure and are used in the same setting (Jansen and de Haan, 2010) , whatever the economic environment throughout the analyzed period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) .
For the ECB, we consider the editorials of the Monthly Bulletin, as they contain an explanation of why interest rates were changed or not, plus a summary statement of the Governing This confirms the fact that central banks use forward guidance as a policy instrument to provide a temporal guidance of their accommodative monetary policies and their unconventional measures when they are confronted to the ZLB. This obviously corresponds to the "Odyssean forward guidance" described by Campbell et al. (2012) .
Moreover, the change in the trend of the Wordscores values for the ECB, the Fed, the BoE and the BoJ from the beginning of 2013 provides additional relevance to this observation. At that time, Ben Bernanke, the previous FED chairman, stated that the U.S. Federal Reserve may be done with its monetary stimulus the next year, this may explain the increase of the Wordscores estimates for the Fed from that period. For the BoJ, this period also corresponds to the start of the "Abenomics" economic policy and to the lunch of the Quantitative and Qualitative Easing, which has not included an explicit forward guidance on the policy rate (Filardo and Hofmann, 2013) . For the ECB and the BoE, this might be the future occurrence of an exit strategy that explain the less accommodative stance of their forward guidance from 2013 5 .
Overall, the estimates of the Wordscores approach give a clear overview of the accommodative content of central banks' forward guidance from 2009, and provide the prospects of the exit strategy that most of the central banks start to consider through their statements. Although it is important to remind that the Wordscores approach is more likely to complement rather than to substitute itself to other predictive methods based on macroeconomic projections for instance, it still gives important insights about the prospects of central banks' moves of the policy rate. 
Conclusion
